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CASENOTES
Did the Supreme Court Fumble?: The Supreme Court's Failure to Endorse a Market
Power Threshold to the Application of the Rule of Reason for Cases under Section I
of the Sherman Act in NCAA v. Board of Regents' — Section 1 of the Sherman Act
provides that every business arrangement in restraint of trade is illegal. 2 Where a party
alleges a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court will, in general, apply a
rule of reason analysis, weighing all of the circumstances of the case in deciding whether
the business arrangement complained of imposes an unreasonable restraint on compe-
tition. 3 The court's rule of reason analysis is often both complicated and prolonged,
however, because it involves a broad inquiry into both the business practices of the
defendant company and the status of the surrounding industry. 4 In order to promote
efficient litigation of section 1 cases, therefore, the courts have developed the "per se
doctrine" and the "market power threshold" as alternative methods of examining the
legality of restraints of trade under the Sherman Act. 6
To avoid the protracted analysis required under the rule of reason, the judiciary
has responded by declaring that certain business arrangements shall be conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable restraints on trade because of their pernicious effect on
competition and their lack of redeeming virtue. 6 When conduct falls within certain
defined areas,' therefore, that conduct can be declared illegal without the need for
exhaustive judicial inquiry into its reasonableness. 2 The Supreme Court has endorsed
the per se doctrine as an effective method of avoiding the rule of reason and its
complicated and prolonged analysis in certain limited circumstances.
In cases where the per se doctrine is inapplicable, many lower courts have held that
proof that a defendant has substantial market power is an indispensable threshold to
the application of the rule of reason.t° Market power is an economic term that relates
104 S. Ct. 2948 (1989).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 provides that, "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
4 In Northern Pac. Ry: Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), the Supreme Court described
the rule of reason as "an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation" of the
challenged business practice. Id. See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
343 (1982) (describing the rule of reason as an "elaborate inquiry").
See infra notes 6-19 and accompanying text for discussion of the "per se doctrine" and the
"market power threshold."
6 See, e.g., Northern, 356 U.S. at 5.
7 Established per se unreasonable business arrangements are: horizontal territorial restrictions
(see, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)); group boycotts (see, e.g.,
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)); tying arrangements (see, e.g.,
Northern, 356 U.S. at 5); horizontal price-fixing schemes (see, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)); and vertical price-fixing schemes (see, e.g., United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45 (1960)).
See, e.g., Northern, 356 U.S. at 5.
Id, See also Arizona, 457 U.S. at 343-44.
1 ° See, e.g., General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th
Cir. 1984); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1984);
White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504 (6th Cir. 1983); Graphic
Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1983); Products Liab. Ins. Agency,
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to the ability of a seller to alter the interaction of supply and demand within the market."
Applying this concept to the resolution of section 1 claims, courts have held that unless
the party who has allegedly restrained trade has market power, its business arrangements
cannot have an adverse effect on the market.' 2
 According to these courts, the absence
of market power implies that the defendant is in competition with firms that sell products
regarded by the consumer as close substitutes for the defendant's." Because of this
competition, the defendant will lose most or all of its sales if it raises its price, or if it
reduces its output.'' BecaOse the defendant's business practices would result only in its
losing sales, they would not adversely affect competition." Price and output would
continue to be determined by the market." Hence, the defendant's practices would not
constitute an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.' 7
 Thus, according to these
courts, when it can be established at the outset of a trial that a defendant does not
possess substantial market power, the section 1 claim against the defendant is dismissed."
The market power threshold, therefore, constitutes a second effective method of avoid-
ing application of the rule of reason.'"
The 1984 case of NCAA v. Board of Regents2° presented the United States Supreme
Court with an opportunity to endorse a market power threshold to the application of
the rule of reason for cases under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 ' NCAA involved the
question of whether the plan to regulate the broadcasting of intercollegiate football
games adopted by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 22
 was legal under
Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 660, 663-65 (7th Cir. 1982); Valley Liquors, Inc. v.
Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660
F.2d 255, 268 (7th Cir. 1981); Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir.
1981); Cowley v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2(.1 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965
(1980); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2c1 381, 390 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936
(1979); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.. 579 F.2d 126, 130 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 946 (1979); Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 90-91 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc, v. Paddock Pool Builders,
Inc., 508 F.2(1 547, 562 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
11 NCAA, 104 S. Ct.- at 2965.
12
 See supra note 10 and accompanying text for lower court decisions applying the market
power threshold. See also Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST
L.J.•135, 159 (1984); Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. Rev. 937, 937
(1981); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U.
Cut. L. REV. 6, 16 (1981).
13
 See supra note 10 and accompanying text for lower court decisions applying the market power
threshold. See also Posner, supra note 12, at 16.
Posner, supra note 12, at 16.
' 5 Id.
IC Id.
See infra note 80 and accompanying text for discussion of the purpose of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
18 See id.
See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text for discussion of the market power threshold
as an effective method of avoiding application of the rule of reason.
'=" 104 S. Cr. 2948 (1984).
21
 Id. at 2965 ("Petitioner argues, however, that its television plan can have no significant
anticompetitive effect since the record indicates that it has no market power „ .'').
22
 The NCAA is an unincorporated, nonprofit, educational association whose membership
includes almost 800 nonprofit public and private universities and more than 100 nonprofit athletic
conferences and other organizations. Id. at 2971 (White, J., dissenting).
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the Sherman Act." That plan involved contracts covering the 1982-85 college football
seasons, which were awarded, after competitive bidding, to two networks, CBS and
ABC.24
 The NCAA's television plan limited the total amount of televised intercollegiate
football and the number of appearances any one team could make. 25
 Under the contracts,
the NCAA granted both ABC and CBS the right to telecast fourteen live "exposures."!"
In turn, each oldie networks agreed to pay a specified minimum aggregate compensation
to the participating NCAA member institutions. 27
Since no college was permitted to sell television rights outside the plan," members
of the College Football Association (CFA), an organization of' major college football
conferences and major independent colleges," began a move in 1979 to give colleges
with major football programs a greater voice in the formulation of college football
television policy." The organization developed its own television plan and proceeded to
obtain a contract offer from NBC. 31 Considering this a violation of association rules, the
NCAA announced that it would take disciplinary action against CFA schools who com-
plied with the contract."
Following this announcement, two members of the CFA, the Universities of Okla-
homa and Georgia, filed an action in the United States District. Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma." According to the universities, the NCAA's regulation of televised
college football violated section 1 of' the Sherman Act because it resulted in price-fixing
23 Id. at 2954. The NCAA began regulating the televising of college football games in 1951. Id.
at 2955. The NCAA's initial television plan for the 1951-53 football seasons was submitted to the
Antitrust Division of the .Department of justice for review. The Division raised no objections. Ste
Petition for A Writ of Certiorari at 3, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
24 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2956. The plan also involved a two-year contract entered into with the
Turner Broadcasting System crBsy Id. at 2956 n.Y.
25 Id. at 2956-57.
29 Id. at 2956. At least 82 different teams had to appear on each network over each two-year
period. Id. at 2957. Also, no college was eligible to appear on television more than a total of six
times during each two-year period. Id. This was subject to the further restriction that no more than
four of those appearances could he national telecasts. Id.
27 Id. at 2956. Each network was obligated to pay a minimum of $131,750,000 over the four
years. Id. TBS was to have paid $17,696,000 over two years. Id, at 2956 11.9.
The practice that had developed over the years involved a representative of the NCAA setting
a recommended fee for different types of telecasts. Id. at 2956. Generally, Division I national
telecasts were the most valuable, Division I regional telecasts were less valuable, and Division II and
Division III games commanded a still lower price. Id. The aggregate of all the network payments
would presumably equal the total minimum aggregate compensation. Id.
2" Id. The plan provided that all forms of televising foot hall games during the plan control
periods "shall be in accordance with this Plan." Id. "Exception" telecasts of games that were sold
out were permitted, however, in the home team's market. Id. at 2956 n.8. They were also permitted
in the visiting team's market when games were being played more than 400 miles from the visiting
team's campus. Id, In both cases, however, the broadcast could not be shown in an area where
another college football game was to be played. Id.
29
 The CFA consists of five of the major football playing conferences — the Big 8, Southeastern,
Southwestern, Atlantic Coast, and Western Athletic Conferences — and major football playing
independents such as Boston College, Notre Dame, Penn State, Pittsburgh, and the service acade-
mies. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1285 (WA). Okla. 1982).
su NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2957.
91 Id. This contract would have allowed more appearances for each university, and would have
increased the revenues of each university. Id,
32 Id.
25 Id.
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and output limitations and it constituted an illegal group boycott. 34 The schools sought
to enjoin the NCAA from violating the antitrust laws in the future."
The district court held that the controls exercised by the NCAA over the televising
of college football were per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and granted
an injunction prohibiting the future implementation of television controls by the
NCAA." The court concluded that competition had been unreasonably restrained in
three ways. 37 First, the court found that the NCAA fixed the price for telecasts." The
court also found that the plan placed an artificial limit on the number of games tele-
vised." Finally, the court found that the exclusive network contracts were tantamount
to a group boycott of all other potential broadcasters." Based on the conclusion that
competition had been unreasonably restrained through a price-fixing scheme, a limit on
output, and a group boycott, the district court held that the NCAA's activities were
illegal per se.'
Although it had concluded that the NCAA television controls constituted a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, the district court also examined the case under the rule
of reason:12 The court explained that since it had already undertaken a detailed inquiry
into the industry, the interest of litigation efficiency would not be offended by
conducting a rule of reason analysis.'" Applying the rule of reason, the court concluded
that the NCAA television controls were unreasonable restraints on competition and,
therefore, illegal,'" In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the nature and the
character of the television controls 45 and the history and the circumstances surrounding
them46 to be determinative. The court did not, however, consider the NCAA's market
power in reaching its conclusion that the NCAA's television controls were unreasonable. 47
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the
NCAA's television controls constituted illegal per se price fixing: 18 The court of appeals
34 Id.
" Id. at 2954. Although the universities obtained a preliminary injunction preventing the NCAA
from initiating disciplinary proceedings, most CFA members were unwilling to commit themselves
to the contractual agreement with NBC. Id. at 2957. As a result, that agreement never materialized.
Id.
NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1311, 1326-27.
37 1d. at 1304-13,
3" id, at 1304-1 1.
3s
40 Id. at 1311-13. The district court also held that the NCAA had violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 1319-23.
" Id. at 1311.
42 Id. at 1313-19.
" Id. at 1314. The court stated:
[On large part, the per se rule was developed for the purpose of avoiding detailed
inquiry into an industry where such an inquiry is unlikely to reveal procompetitive
justifications for the challenged restraint. In this case, the court has already undertaken
a detailed inquiry into this industry, and the interest of litigation efficiency is not
offended by conducting a rule of reason analysis.
Id.
" Id. at 1319.
45 id .
46 Id,
47 Id. at 1313-19.
" Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir. 1983). The court of appeals
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concluded, however, that the injunction, which banned the NCAA from taking any role
in telecasting, swept too broadly. 49 The case was remanded to the lower court for
modification of the injunction. 59
Although it agreed with the district court that the NCAA television controls consti-
tuted a per se violation of the Sherman Act, the court of appeals also considered the
case under the rule of reason. 5 ' The court indicated that it did so because, given the
prospect of Supreme Court review, scrutinizing the television plan under the rule of
reason promoted litigation efficiency." Under this type of analysis as well, the court
concluded that the NCAA television controls were unreasonable restraints on competi-
tion in violation of the Sherman Act."
The court of appeals began its rule of reason analysis by noting that gauging the
television plan's net effect on competition required an assessment of the NCAA's market
power." The court stated that whether market power existed depended upon the exis-
tence of competing products to which a consumer could turn when faced with relative
price increases. 55 Based on the district court's finding that NCAA football constituted a
unique type of Saturday afternoon programming, the court of appeals concluded that
the NCAA possessed market power. 56 In light of its conclusion that the NCAA possessed
market power, the court stated that the risks of anticompetitive effects were imminent."
Against those risks, the court held that the NCAA's proffered procompetitive justifica-
tions were insufficient. 58 Having found the risks of anticompetitive effects imminent and
having rejected the procompetitive justifications, the court of appeals concluded that the
television plan created an unreasonable restraint on trade. 59
The Supreme Court granted stay of judgment of the court of appeals,"° and then
certiorari."' Upon its consideration of the case, the Court rejected the lower courts' use
found it unnecessary to consider any alleged violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act, id. at 1159 n.16,
as did the Supreme Court. 104 S. Ct. at 2957-58 n. 12. The court of appeals also rejected the district
court's boycott holding. NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1161. The court explained that all broadcasters were
free to negotiate for the contract. Id. at 1160-61.
49 NCAA, 707 F.2d at 1162. The court stated that the NCAA could appropriately use television
controls as sanctions for violating other rules. Id. The court noted that controls could be used to
prohibit telecasting on Friday nights, when high schools play. Id. Also, the court was not willing to
prohibit the NCAA from formulating other less restrictive plans. Id.
50 Id, The dissenting Justice of the court of appeals would have denied the injunction altogether.
Id. (Barret, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justice based his conclusion on the ground that the
television plan's primary purpose was not anticompetitive. Id. at 1167 (Barret, J., dissenting). The
dissenting Justice explained that the television plan was designed to further NCAA objectives of
maintaining intercollegiate football as an amateur sport and as an adjunct of the academic endeavors
of the member institutions. Id. (Barret, J., dissenting).
5' Id. at 1157-60.
92 1d. at 1157.
" Id. at 1160.
54 Id. at 1158.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1158-59.
57 Id. at 1159.
" Id. at 1160.
59 Id.
6° NCAA, 463 U.S. 1311 (1983). Anticipating that the Court would grant certiorari, Justice
White stayed the judgment of the court of appeals. 104 S. Ct. at 2974 (White, J., dissenting).
61 NCAA, 464 U.S. 913 (1983).
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of the per se doctrine, instead concluding that the proper standard of review was the
rule of reason because at least some restraints among schools were essential to the
existence of college football games.° The Court began its rule of reason analysis by
pointing out that because the NCAA's television plan restrained both price and output
it had a significant potential for anticompetitive effects.° The NCAA maintained that
its television plan could not have had an anticompetitive impact because the association
had no market power." The Court rejected this argument, holding that proof of market
power was not needed to condemn the restraint because the NCAA's plan was a naked
restriction on price and output. 65 The Court went on, however, to find that the NCAA
did in fact possess market power. 66 The Court also rejected the NCAA's argument that
its television plan actually promoted competition. 67 After analyzing the case under the
rule of reason, therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings that the
NCAA's television plan violated section 1 of the Sherman Act."
In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity
to set forth a more structured rule of reason analysis, which would allow courts to avoid
burdensome analysis in certain of those cases not involving activities which trigger the
per se doctrine.° Specifically, the Supreme Court was called upon to require a prelimi-
nary inquiry into the defendant's market power. 70 Under that inquiry, if adopted, a
failure by the plaintiff to establish the defendant's market power in a section 1 case
under the rule of reason would be diapositive in the defendant's favor. 7 ' In thus bypassing
some of the rule's complicated and prolonged analysis, this threshold market power
inquiry would provide structure to the rule of reason analysis. The Supreme Court,
however, failed to endorse the market power threshold, holding that it had not required
proof of market power in the past and that in any event the NCAA did possess market
power. 72
This casenote deals with the Supreme Court's failure to adopt a market power
threshold to the application of the rule of reason analysis. Part 1 will begin by tracing
the history and development of the rule of reason under the antitrust laws of the United
States. 73 The emphasis will be on the problematic structure of analysis that has evolved
from the decisions of the Supreme Court in this area. Part I will then focus on the
development of the two methods of avoiding application of the rule of reason, the per
52 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2960.
ns Id. at 2962.
"-$ Id. at 2965.
"' Id,
"" Id. at 2966.
1 7 Id. at 2967-70.
"" Id. at 2971.
69 Id. at 2965.
7" Id.
7, This proposition is based on the fact that, in some cases, the defendant's market power may
be so minimal that no elaborate analysis of the challenged business practice is needed to establish
that the defendant could not unreasonably restrain competition. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note
12, at 159; Landes and Posner, supra note 12, at 937; Posner, supra note 12, at 16.
72 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2965-66.
73 See infra notes 78-125 and accompanying text for discussion of the history and development
of the rule of reason.
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se doctrine" and the market power threshold. 75 The effectiveness of these methods of
avoiding the protracted analysis common under the rule of reason will be the emphasis
in these sections of Part I. Part II will examine the Court's opinion in NCAA v. Board of
Regents. 7fi Primary focus in Part II will be on the Supreme Court's treatment of the
market power issue. Finally, Part III of this casenote will point out legal and factual
errors in the Court's failure to endorse a market power threshold." Part III will conclude
that the Court should have endorsed a market power threshold given the benefits
associated with it.
1. THE HISTORY OF THE RESOLUTION OF SECTION 1 CLAIMS
A. The Development of the Rule of Reason
Since enacted by Congress in 1890, the Sherman Act has been the basic antitrust
legislation in this country." Section 1 of the Sherman Act dOlares contracts, combina-
tions or conspiracies in restraint of trade to be unlawful.'" The purpose of section 1 is
to promote competition and to inhibit restraints upon freedom of trade."
When it enacted the Sherman Act, Congress left to the courts determination of the
scope and meaning of the language used." In early cases, the Supreme Court followed
a literal reading of the section 1 language so as to forbid every arrangement in restraint
of trade." Early analysis of the legality of challenged business practices was neither
" See infra notes 126-153 and accompanying text for discussion of the development of the per
se doctrine.
" See infra notes 154-184 and accompanying text for discussion of the development of the
market power threshold.
76 See infra notes 185-258 and accompanying text for discussion of the NCAA opinion.
" See infra notes 259-344 and accompanying text for discussion of legal and factual errors in
the Court's failure to endorse a market power threshold.
78 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 13 (1977).
" 15 U.S.C. § I (1982). Section 1 provides that, "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
'° L. SULLIVAN, supra note 78, at 14. See also Northern, 356 U.S. at 4. The Northern Court stated
that:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on
the assumption that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and
the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
Id.
81 See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,312 (1897).
" Id. at 328. Trans-Missouri involved a cartel created by the eighteen railroads providing service
west of the Mississippi River. Id, at 292. The government challenged the legality of the cartel's rate
structure under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 297. The railroads argued that the statute
really meant to declare illegal only those arrangements which were unreasonable restraints of trade.
Id. at 327-28. They asserted that the object of their cartel was merely to establish reasonable rates.
Id. at 303. In rejecting this argument and declaring the cartel illegal under section 1, the Court
first noted that determining what a reasonable rate was would be an uncertain process. Id. at 331.
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complicated nor prolonged because the Court did not consider whether a restraint on
trade was reasonable or unreasonable in deeming it unlawful." In price-fixing cases, for
example, the Court considered the price yielded by open competition to be the only
objective test of reasonableness." Any other price was necessarily unreasonable and,
therefore, violated the Sherman Act." Only later, when the Court began to focus on the
reasonableness of restraints on trade, did judicial consideration of claims under section
1 of the Sherman Act become burdensome."
As the Supreme Court slowly moved away from its literal reading of section 1, a7
antitrust defendants continued to assert that the reasonableness of the restraint on trade
should be determinative in these cases." In 1911, in Standard Oil Company of New Jersey
a. United Slates," the Supreme Court reviewed the matter again, and held that challenged
business practices violated section 1 of the Sherman Act only when they created unrea-
sonable restraints on trade." Thus, the Court in Standard Oil adopted a rule of reason
to determine when business activities which created restraints on trade also violated the
Sherman Act. 9 I
In light of that uncertainty, the Court concluded section I condemned every restraint of trade and
recognized no exceptions. Id. at 328.
The initial articulation by the Supreme Court of "reason" as an antitrust concept did, however,
appear in the dissenting opinion of Justice White in Trans-Missouri. Id. at 343 (White, J., dissenting).
White stated that "the words 'restraint of trade' embrace only contracts which unreasonably restrain
trade, and, therefore ... reasonable contracts, although they, in sonic measure, 'restrain trade,' are
not within the meaning of the words." Id. at 346 (White, J., dissenting).
0 Id. at 328.
84 Id.
8' Id.
," See infra notes 116-25 and accompanying text for discussion of the burdensome analysis
under the rule of reason.
0
 This gradual evolution away from a literal reading of section 1 of the Sherman Act began
with United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). In striking down a railroad cartel
similar to the one in Trans-Missouri, the Court distinguished between arrangements which directly
and immediately reduced competition, such as the rate agreement among competing railroads
before the Court, and arrangements which have only indirect or incidental effects on competition.
Id. at 568. The latter were, the Court stated, not intended to be covered by the Sherman Act. Id.
See, e.g., Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 592 (1898) (upholding an agreement by members
of a livestock exchange to set commissions because it had no direct effect on interstate commerce).
In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899), the Court further qualified its literal reading of section 1, but reasonableness was once again
rejected as a standard. 85 F. 271, 284-93 (6th Cir. 1898). Addyston Pipe & Steel involved the
cartelization of the iron pipe trade. Specifically, six leading producers of iron pipe had divided the
country into territories, had fixed the pipe prices in each territory, and then had divided the
business among themselves. Id. at 273-74. In an opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declared that it would recognize the validity of restraints that were
merely ancillary to agreements that were otherwise economically beneficial. Id. at 282. The court
reasoned that when a restraint was truly ancillary its competitive benefits were likely to outweigh
the losses. Id. at 282-83. The court concluded, however, that the arrangement in Addyston Pipe &
Steel was clearly not ancillary to an economically beneficial agreement. Id. at 291.
'o See id.
0
 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
911 Id. at 74-75.
91 Id. at 66. The Court claimed that this had always been the Court's position. Id. at 64. The
Court asserted that reason was resorted to in deciding Trans-Missouri and joint Traffic. Id. Never-
theless, the Court stated that those decisions were now "limited and qualified." Id. at 68.
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In Standard Oil, a combination of thirty-seven oil companies had been brought under
one management and control through a common holding company. 92 The government
alleged that the defendant oil companies were conspiring to restrain the trade in petro-
leum in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act through the common holding company
arrangement." The Supreme Court held that the common holding company arrange-
ment violated the Sherman Act, and ordered its dissolution.'" In concluding that the
defendant's arrangement violated section 1, the Court stated that only undue restraints
of trade were illegal under the antitrust laws." The Court explained that prohibiting
every restraint of trade would be both impractical and contrary to congressional desire. 96
In resolving whether a particular practice restricted competition to a degree which could
be called undue, the Court stated that it was necessary to resort to the standard of
reason." Applying the standard of reason to the common holding company arrangement
in Standard Oil, the Court found that the arrangement was unreasonable because it had
unduly interfered with competition. 98
While Standard Oil represented a step forward from the literalness of earlier section
1 interpretations, the rule of reason adopted in that case was of uncertain content. 99
The Standard Oil Court left this new standard to be expounded upon by subsequent case
law 19° Seven years later, in Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States,"" the
Court provided broad guidelines on how to apply the rule of reason. which it had
enunciated in Standard Oil."
In determining whether an agreement providing for a liXed price for after hours
grain trading violated section I, the Board of Trade Court suggested a list of factors that
would be relevant in determining whether a restraint on competition was unreasona-
ble. 19 ' The Board of Trade Court first reiterated the position taken in Standard Oil that
92 Id. at 41.
93 1d. at 30.
94 Id. at 74-75.
95 Id. at 60.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 63-64.
" Id. at 74-75.
" P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, § 1500 (1986) ("Without further elaboration, reasonableness is
too vague
m In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the rule of reason, but it did not expound upon the new standard of review. Id. at 180.
That case involved the defendant's attempt to restrain trade within the tobacco industry. Id. at 148.
In declaring the defendant's practices illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court stated
that the duty to construe the words "restraint of trade" was one that could only be discharged by
a resort to reason. Id. at 180.
"' 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The Board of Trade was the center through which most of the grain
trading in Chicago was done. Id. at 235. The exchange had adopted a rule which required members
of the exchange to establish an off-hour trading price for grain that arrived when the exchange
was closed. Id. at 237. The government questioned the legality of such a rule under the Sherman
Act. Id.
'"2 Id. at 238-40.
1 { 0 Id, at 238. The Court stated that under the rule of reason:
1tThe Court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature
of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to he attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will
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the standard of review could not be the mere restraint of trade,lc" noting that every
agreement concerning trade restrains trade to some extent.'" The Court asserted that
challenged agreements had to be analyzed in light of reason, stating that the reason-
ableness of a restraint was dependent upon its effect on competition.'"
According to the Board of Trade Court, among the factors relevant to the judicial
determination of a restraint's reasonableness under the rule of reason would be the
nature of the challenged restraint, the actual effect of the restraint on competition, and
the probable effect of the restraint. G7 The Court stated that the history of the challenged
restraint, the reason for adopting the restraint, and the end sought to be attained would
also be relevant. 1 °8 Finally, the Board of Trade Court noted that the nature of the business
to which the restraint was applied, the condition of that business before the restaint was
imposed, and the condition of that business after the restraint was imposed also war-
ranted judicial consideration as part of the rule of reason analysis.'"
Under its newly articulated rule of reason doctrine, the Supreme Court concluded
that the Board's agreement providing for a fixed price for after hours grain trading did
not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act."° In considering the nature of the Board's
agreement, the Court found that the restriction was merely upon the period of price
making."' In examining the scope of the Board's agreement, the Court noted that the
agreement applied only during a small part of the business day, and that it applied only
to a small part of the grain shipped to Chicago." 2 Finally, focusing on the effects of the
Board's agreement, the Court found that, since the agreement did not apply to grain
shipped to other markets, the agreement had no appreciable effect on general market
prices."' Having focused on the nature, the scope, and the effect of the challenged
agreement, the Court concluded that the agreement was reasonable and did not, there-
fore, violate the Sherman Act." 4
Board of Trade remains the leading Supreme Court case outlining the rule of reason
analysis.' 15 The Board of Trade factors continue to be used to aid courts in determining
whether a particular arrangement tends to suppress competition unreasonably. 116 Never-
theless, lower courts have had difficulty applying the Board of Trade factors in cases
involving section 1 claims because the Supreme Court has never assigned relative weight
to each factor. 17 Furthermore, the Court has not indicated which factors are determi-
save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.,
Id.
104 Id.
'° Id.
105 Id. The Court stated that "Nile true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition." Id.
' 07 Id.
' 08 Id.
'as Id.
10
	 at 239.
m Id.
its Id.
Id. at 240.
" Id. at 239.
It remains common practice to include the Court's formulation of the rule of reason from
Board of Trade in the jury instructions in section 1 cases. Posner, supra note 12, at 15.
See id.
117 Id. at 14-15 ("This passage [from Chicago Board of Trade] invites an unlimited, free-wheeling
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native of the issue of unreasonable restraints on competition)" These oversights on the
Court's part have produced a common criticism of the rule of reason analysis that "[w]hen
everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive."""
Great difficulties in the litigation of section I claims stem from the vague judicial
declarations of the rule of reason analysis. 12" Due to the lack of an existing analytical
framework for applying the rule of reason in antitrust litigation, the rule of reason
analysis is often both complicated and prolonged because it involves a broad inquiry into
both the business practices of the defendant company and the status of the surrounding
industry.' 21
 As a result of this protracted factual inquiry, antitrust cases under the rule
of reason are extremely costly.'" In addition to this burden on the litigants, the rule of
reason also places a burden on the judicial system. Both judges and juries are often
unable to do what the current open-ended formulations require of them because they
lack the expert understanding of market economies needed to determine a practice's
overall effect on competition.'" Moreover, given the lack of a clear analytical framework
for applying the rule of reason, the decision in any given case provides little certainty
about the legality of a challenged business practice in another context. L 24 Thus, businesses
are left with little to aid them in predicting what courts will find to be illegal business
practices under the Sherman Act. 12 "
B. The Development of the Per Se Doctrine
In an effort to avoid the complicated and prolonged analysis of section 1 claims
required under Standard Oil and Board of Trade, the judiciary developed another standard
of review for certain antitrust cases. 126
 Under this standard, the per se doctrine, certain
activities, which courts have found to have a pernicious effect on competition and to
lack redeeming virtue, have been conclusively presumed to create unreasonable restraints
on trade. 127
 Those activities subject to the per se doctrine are illegal regardless of how
they effect the market in individual cases.'"
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 12" decided nine years after Board of Trade, rep-
resents an early step in the Supreme Court's development of the per se doctrine. In that
inquiry .... [T]he trier of fact is left in the dark as to how to decide whether a challenged practice
is substantially anticompetitive."). See also Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 155 ("[Supreme Court]
formulations [of the rule of reason] are empty.").
"8 See Posner, supra note 12, at 14-15.
119 Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 155.
' 2° See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text for discussion of the difficulties in the
litigation of section 1 claims under the rule of reason.
' 2 ' In Northern, 356 U.S. at 5, the Supreme Court described the rule of reason as "an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation" of the challenged business practice. Id. See also
Arizona, 457 U.S. at 343 (describing the rule of reason as an "elaborate inquiry").
' 22
 The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of a
challenged business practice entails significant costs." Arizona, 457 U.S. at 343.
'" Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 153-55. See also Posner, supra note 12, at 15.
124
 See, e.g., Arizona, 457 U.S. at 343; United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609
11.10 (1972).
125 Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 155.
L26 See infra notes 129-53 and accompanying text for discussion of the development of the per
se doctrine.
127 See, e.g., Northern, 356 U.S. at 5.
L28 Id.
129 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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case, the makers of bathroom fixtures had formed a cartel which fixed prices and limited
sales to specified jobbers.'" The Court held that the arrangement violated the Sherman
Act)' In striking down the arrangement, the Court noted that the aim and result of
every price-fixing agreement was the elimination of competition.' 32 The Court concluded
that that alone made price-fixing agreements unreasonable, without the necessity of
further analysis)"
Thirteen years later, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.)" the Supreme Court
first articulated a formal per se doctrine."' Socony-Vacuum involved a concerted program
by major oil refiners to buy independent refiners' surplus oil.'s 6 The Court held that the
defendants' arrangement was unlawful per se.'" Having labelled the defendants' ar-
rangement as a price-fixing agreement,' 38 the Court indicated that it would not permit
inquiry into a price-fixing agreement's reasonableness.'"
In the 1958 case of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,"" the Supreme Court
extended the reach of per se doctrine to an activity other than price-fixing."' In Northern
Pacific, the Court held that the defendant railroad's preferential routing agreements
were unlawful per se under section I of the Sherman Act." 2 The Court stated that,
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of redeeming virtue, certain
restraints on trade could be conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.'' ' ' The Northern
Pacific Railway Court pointed out that, through conclusive presumptions of unreasona-
bleness, the per se doctrine avoided the necessity for complicated and prolonged analysis
to determine whether a restraint has been unreasonable."' Using this per se analysis,
the Court concluded that tying arrangements,"' such as the defendant's preferential
routing agreements, would be conclusively presumed to he unreasonable. "6
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's extension of the per se doctrine in Northern
Pacific Railway, in addition to horizontal'" and vertical price-fixing schemes"" and tying
arrangements, 199 both horizontal territorial restrictions"" and group boycotts"' have
Id. at 394.
Ill Id. at 907.
'" id. at 397.
133 Id. at 397-98.
"4 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
tss Id. at 223. The Court stated that "joinder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a
commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." Id.
,36 Id. at 179.
"7 Id. at 223.
' 38 1d. at 219-23.
'3n Id. at 223.
'" 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
j 41 id. at 8.
142 Id.
' 43 Id. at 5.
"4 Id.
145 The Northern Court defined a tying arrangement as "an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at
least agrees that he will riot purchase that product from any other supplier." Id. at 5-6.
146 /d. at 8.
' 47 See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211,213 (1951).
' 48 See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,45 (1960).
119 See, e.g., Northern, 356 U.S. at 5.
"° See, e.g., Topco, 405 U.S. at 608.
' 5 ' See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,212 (1959).
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been declared to be unlawful per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.'" With respect
to business conduct that falls within one of the recognized per se categories, that conduct
will be conclusively presumed to restrain trade unreasonably.'" In those cases, the per
se doctrine serves as an effective method of avoiding the problems associated with
litigating claims under the rule of reason.
C. The Development of the Market Power Threshold
The literal reading of section 1 of the Sherman Act gave way to the rule of reason
analysis.'" That analysis was, in turn, later joined by the per se doctrine.'" If, however,
the challenged restraint is not one of those conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
under the per se doctrine, then it must be proven to be unreasonable under the rule of
reason.'" For those cases, many lower courts have opted for a more structured rule of
reason analysis.''? These courts, as part of a more structured rule of reason, have held
that proof that the defendant has substantial market power is an indispensable threshold
to the application of the rule of reason.'" Under this type of analysis, when it can he
established at the outset of a trial that the defendant does not possess substantial market
power, a court dismisses the section I claims without further examination of the defen-
dant's business or the surrounding industry.'" Thus, the threshold inquiry into market
power becomes a second effective method of avoiding application of the rule of reason.'"
While this market power threshold has not been endorsed by the Supreme Court,
it has been adopted by the First Circuit,m the Second Circuit,' 62 the Fifth Circuit,'" the
12 New areas of per se illegality are not likely to be determined without full analysis of the
market impact of the practice. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963)
(too little known about vertical territorial restraints to make them illegal per se). Furthermore, old
areas of per se illegality may be subject to erosion, requiring further resort to the rule of reason.
See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 35 (1984) (O'Connord., concurring)
("The time has ... come to abandon the 'per se' label and refocus the inquiry on the adverse
economic effects, and i he potential economic benefits, that the tie (tying arrangement] may have.")..
15" See, e.g., Northern, 356 U.S. at 5.
154 See supra notes 81-12.5 and accompanying text for discussion of the development of the
rule of reason analysis.
'5 ' See supra notes 126-53 and accompanying text for discussion of the development of the per
se doctrine.
156 See supra notes 81-125 and accompanying text for discussion of the rule of reason.
'" See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text for lower court decisions endorsing the
market power threshold.
' 50 See id.
' 69 See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text for discussion of the market power threshold
as an effective method of avoiding application of the rule of reason.
160 See id.
16 ' See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders Inc.; 508 F.2d 547, 562 (1st Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975) ("There still must be some consideration of the effect of a
defendant's conduct on some significant part of the market.").
' 62 See Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 130 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1979). But see Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir.
1980).
9" See Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[P]roof of the
antitrust defendant's 'substantial' market power should he a preliminary hurdle ...."); Northwest
Power Prods., Inc. v. ()mark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1116 (1979) ("[The defendants] conspicuously lack ... market power . ...'').
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Sixth Circuit,'",
 the Seventh Circuit, 165 the Ninth Circuit, 166
 and the Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals. 167
 As a means of structuring the rule of reason, these circuits now
insist., at the outset of the trial, that the plaintiff establish that the defendant has sub-
stantial market power.'" Market power is an economic term that describes the ability of
a seller to alter the interaction of supply and demand within the market. 160 Specifically,
a party possessing market power can raise the price of its product significantly above
competitive levels without losing so many sales that the increase in price is unprofitable.' 7"
Absence of market power, on the other hand, implies that the defendant is in competition
with firms that sell products regarded by the ctinsumer as close substitutes for the
defendant's. 171
 Because of this competition, the defendant will lose most or all of its sales
if it raises its price, or if it reduces its output.' 72 By losing its sales, the defendant's
practices cannot affect competition, and price and output will continue to be determined
by the market.'" Thus, unless the party who has allegedly restrained trade has market
power, its business arrangements cannot have an adverse effect on the market and, thus,
will not constitute violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'"
In Muenster Butane, Inc, v. Stewart Co.,' 77
 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the market power threshold in resolving a dispute under section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 7"
' 64 See White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp, Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 1983)
("Without proof of requisite monopoly power, AI{SC is simply an integrated company, facing across
the board competition in every area of hospital supplies it sells ....").
"' 5 See General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Association, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th
Cir. 1984) ('With the rule of reason becoming a more popular rule of decision ... some progress
has been made toward giving it some structure by requiring that the plaintiff first prove that the
defendant has sufficient market power to restrain competition substantially."); Jack Walters & Sons
Corp. v. Morton Building, Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[Evaluation under the rule of
reason] means „ . that the plaintiff must show that the defendant has market power, as this is a
prerequisite to being able to restrain trade unreasonably."); Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v.
Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 660, 663-65 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The threshold issues would be
what the relevant market was and what [the defendant's] share of that market was."); Valley Liquors,
Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) ("A popular [shortcut] is to say
(hat the balance tips in the defendant's favor if the plaintiff fails to show that the defendant has
significant market power."); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 268 (7th Cir. 1981)
("The requirement that plaintiffs prove adverse impact in the relevant market to establish a § 1
rule of reason violation is well established in the Seventh Circuit.").
166 See Cowley v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
965'(1980); Gough v. Rossrnoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 390 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936
( I 979).
' 67 See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568 (11th Cir. 1983) ("We
have narrowed the broad-ranging inquiry called for by the rule of reason by insisting, at the
threshold,• that a plaintiff ... establish the market power of the defendant."). But see Harold
Friedman Inc. v. Thorofare Mkts. Inc., 587 F.2d 127, 141 (3d Cir. 1978).
11" See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text for lower court decisions applying the market
power threshold.
109 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2965.
L70 Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 937.
171
 Posner, supra note 12, at 16.
' 72
 Id.
i ” Id.
174 See supra note 12 and accompanying text for the assertion that the practices of a business
without market power cannon adversely effect competition.
' 7 ' 651 F.2d 292 (Si!, Cir. 1981).
176 Id. at 298.
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In this case, the court held that the plaintiff had not met its burden of proving that the
defendant possessed substantial market power.'" Based on its application of the market
power threshold, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. 178
Muenster Butane involved the termination by the defendant, a Zenith distributor, of
its franchise relationship with the plaintiff." 9
 In analyzing the plaintiff's section 1 claims
under the rule of reason, the court declared that proof of the defendant's substantial
market power would be a preliminary hurdle.' 8° Since the plaintiff had produced no
evidence suggesting that Zenith televisions were unique, the court concluded that the
defendant had no market power.'"' Based on its conclusion that the defendant had no
market power, the court held that the defendant had not violated section I of the
Sherman Act. 182
The Muenster Butane court observed that a requirement that the plaintiff prove
market power at the district court level in this case would have saved both the litigants
and the courts much expense.'" Through its application of the market power threshold,
Muenster Butane exemplifies the idea that, when it can be established at the outset of a
trial that the defendant does 110i possess substantial market power, the threshold inquiry,
into market power becomes a second effective method of avoiding application of the
rule of reason."'
II. THE NCAA V. BOARD OF REGENTS OPINION
In NCAA v. Board of Regents,i"5
 the United States Supreme Court applied rule of
reason analysis to hold that the NCAA's television plan violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act.'m The Court struck down NCAA regulation of televised college football after full
inquiry into the reasonableness of the anticompetitive effects of the plan on the market
in light of the procompetitive justifications offered by the NCAA.' 87 During the course
of that inquiry, the Court rejected the NCAA's assertion that its television plan could
not have significant anticompetitive effects because the association had no market
power. 188
NCAA involved the question of whether the plan to regulate the broadcasting of
intercollegiate football games adopted by the NCAA violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act.'" The NCAA's television plan limited the total amount of televised intercollegiate
'" Id.
'" Id.
' 79 Id. at 294-95.
"" Id. at 298.
1 "' Id, at 296-98.
1 ' 2 Id. at 298.
183 Id.
1 " Id.
185 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
1"6 Id. at 2971. The Supreme Court noted that it had to accord great weight to findings of fact
made by a district court and affirmed by a court of appeals. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623
(1982). The NCAA, however, did not request that the Court set aside any of the findings of the
district court. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2959 n.15. Rather, the NCAA contended that the lower courts
had erred as a matter of law on the question of the legality of the television plan. Id.
' 87 Id. at 2959-70.
188 Id. at 2965.
189
 Id. at 2954.
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football"' and specified the compensation to be received by the participating NCAA
member institutions. 19 ' The Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia asserted that the
NCAA's regulation of televised college football violated antitrust law in that it resulted
in both price-fixing and output limitation. 192
In determining whether to review the case under the rule of reason, the Supreme
Court noted that the NCAA television plan created a horizontal restraint, 17" the results
of which were restricted output'" and fixed price.'" 5 Although horizontal price-fixing
and output limitation would normally be condemned under the per se doctrine because
the probability that they are anticompetitive is so high, the Supreme Court stated that
the proper standard of review in this case was the rule of reason.' 96
 The Court explained
that its decision was not based on a lack of judicial experience with this type of arrange-
ment,' 97 nor on the fact that the NCAA is a nonprofit entity,'" nor on respect for the
NCAA's role in intercollegiate athletics.' 99 Instead, the Court emphasized that college
football was an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the
product is to be made available to the public at all.m Therefore, the Court concluded
19° Id. at 2956-57.
19 ' Id. at 2956.
192 Id. at 2957.
' 93 A horizontal restraint is an agreement among competitors on the way in which they will
compete with one another. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-
57 (1982); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694-95 (1978);
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2959-60. The Court explained that the television agreement placed an
artificial limit on the quantity of televised football available to the public. Id. The Court noted that
cases have held limitations on output to be unreasonable restraints of trade. Id. at 2960. See, e.g.,
Topco, 405 U.S. at 608; United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 355 (1967); United States v.
American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 389-90 (1923); American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410-12 (1921).
195
 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2960. The Court stated that since the television agreement's minimum
aggregate price arrangement operated to preclude any actual price negotiation, the television
agreement fixed price. Id. The Court stated that price-fixing was the paradigm of an unreasonable
restraint of trade. Id. See, e.g., Arizona, 457 U.S. at 344-48; Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643, 647 (1980); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213
(1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuton Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 212-14 (1940); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1927).
' 96 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2960.
I "? Id. A per se rule should not be applied until the courts have gained considerable experience
with the challenged restraint and have found it to have no purpose except for the stifling of
competition. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979); Tom, 405 U.S. at
607-08; White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
198 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2960. There is no doubt that the broad language of section 1 applies
to nonprofit entities. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1975). For a
case dealing with the imposition of antitrust liability on a nonprofit entity engaged in anticompetitive
conduct, see American Soc'y of Mechanical Engr's, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576
(1982).
'" NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2960. Good motives will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive
practice. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1948); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. I, 16 n.15 (1945); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49
(1912).
200 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2961. The Court explained that there were a number of rules which
had to be agreed upon in order to play college football, and that those rules all restrained the
manner in which the colleges competed. Id. The Court also stated that the integrity of' college
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that by widening consumer choice the NCAA's actions could be viewed as procompeti-
tive. 20 ' The Court stated that this conclusion necessitated the application of the rule of
reason even though horizontal pricefixing and output limitations would usually be held
to be illegal per se. 2° 2
At the outset of its rule of reason analysis, however, the Supreme Court rejected
the NCAA's assertion that its television plan could not have significant anticompetitive
effects because it had no market power. 2" First, the Court concluded that, as a matter
of-law, the absence of proof of market power would not justify a naked restriction on
price or output. 204 The Court added that it had never required proof of market power
in similar cases. 2°5
The Court likewise rejected the NCAA's market power argument because it found
that the NCAA did in fact possess market power. 200 The Court stated that the correct
test for determining whether college football telecasts constituted a separate market for
calculating the NCAA's market share was whether there were other products that could
reasonably be substituted for televised college footba11. 2" The Court agreed with the
football could not have been preserved except by mutual agreement. Id. The Court noted that the
NCAA played a vital role in establishing the rules of play and preserving the integrity of college
football. Id. Based on that role, the Court stated that the NCAA enabled a product to be marketed
which might otherwise be unavailable. Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 2960. There are, in fact, a great number of cases applying the rule of reason to cases
involving amateur and professional sports. See, e.g., Brenner v. Work! Boxing Council, 675 F.2d
445, 455 (2d Cir. 1982); North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249,
1259 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); U.S. Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n,
665 F.2d 781, 787-88 (7th Cir. 1981) (en bane); Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297,
1299 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1977); Hennessey v.
NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1151-52 (5th Cir. 1977); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606,
619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. clism'd, 434 U.S. 8{}1 (1977); Bridge Corp. of Am. v. American Contract
Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971); Asso-
ciation for Intercollegiate Athletics for 'Women v. NCAA, 558 F. Supp. 487, 495 (D.C. 1983); Justice
v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 380 (D. Ariz. 1983); Gunter Harz Sports v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 511 F.
Supp. 1103, 1116 (D. Neb. 1981), aff'd, 665 F.2d 222, 223 (8th Cir. 1981); Cooney v. American
Horse Shows Ass'n, inc., 495 F. Supp. 424, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Warner Amex Cable Communi-
cations, Inc, v. ABC, 499 F. Supp. 537, 546 (S.D. Ohio, F.D. 1980); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 468 F. Supp. 154, 166 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
634 F.2d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir. 1980); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 304 (D. Mass. 1975).
Furthermore, commentators generally deem it advisable to evaluate the regulations of sports
leagues under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Closius, Not at the Behest of Nonlabor Groups: A Revised
Prognosis for a Maturing Sports Industry, 24 B.C.L. REV. 341, 345 (1983); Kurlantzick, Thoughts on
Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws: Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National
Football League, •15 CONN. L. REV. 183, 192 n.48 (1983); Blecher and Daniels, Professional Sports
and the "Single Entity" Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4 WHITTIER L. REV. 217, 238
(1982).
NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2965. The NCAA argued that a finding of no market power was
dispositive in its favor. See Brief for the Petitioner at 34, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct.
2948 (1984).
204 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2965.
21' Id. As authority for this proposition the Court cited United States v. McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1956), United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221
(1940), and Kim's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2966.
207 Id. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); United States v. E.1.
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district court's conclusion that no other product could be 'readily substituted for college
football for two reasons,'" First, the Court stated, for many viewers there is no substitute
for college footba11. 209
 Second, the Court noted that college football generated an audi-
ence uniquely attractive to advertisers. 210 According to the Court, these findings sup-
ported the conclusion that no other product could be readily substituted for college
footba11. 2 " Therefore, the Court stated that the relevant market for calculating the
NCAA's market share was televised college footba11. 212
 With the relevant market so
defined, the Court held that the NCAA possessed market power because it exercised
complete control over college football broadcasts. 213
The Court then continued its analysis under the rule of reason with an assessment
of the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA's television plan. 2 " According to the Court,
the anticompetitive effects of the arrangement were readily apparent. 215
 In support of
this conclusion, the Court stated that, due to the NCAA's television controls, the price
was higher and the output lower than they would otherwise have been. 216 The Court
suggested that these were the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the
Sherman Act was intended to prohibit. 217
Having found the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA's television plan to be readily
apparent, the Court then focused on the procompetitive justifications offered by the
DO Pont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953).
2°8 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2966. Professional football, which is perhaps the most logical substitute
for NCAA football, is effectively precluded by the terms of its antitrust exemption from being
broadcast on Saturday afternoons during the NCAA football season. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1293,
1294.
209 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2966.
"° Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 2966-67. The Court stated that "tiff college football broadcasts be defined as a separate
market — and we are convinced they are — then the NCAA's complete control over those broadcasts
provides a solid basis for the district court's conclusion that the NCAA possesses market power with
respect to those broadcasts." Id.
214 Id. at 2962-64.
215 Id. at 2963.
216 Id .
217 Id. at 2964. The Court also noted that the universities had lost their freedom to compete.
Id. at 2963. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v, FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941); Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 47-48 (1912); Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S.
38, 44-45 (1904). In addition, the Court indicated that both price and output were unresponsive
to consumer preference. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2963-64. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 343 (1979) ("Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription.'"). The
Court also pointed out that, since all member institutions need NCAA approval in order to compete
in intercollegiate athletics, members had no choice but to adhere to the NCAA's television plan.
NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2963. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1963);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1945). Finally, the Court stated that because
only those broadcasters able to bid on the entire season could compete for television rights to
college football, the NCAA's television plan eliminated competitors from the market. NCAA, 104
S. Ct. at 2964. The Court stated that the impact on competitors was analogous to the effect of block
booking in the motion picture industry — a practice that the Court held to violate the Sherman
Act in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 154 (1948). NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at
2964 n.36.
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NCAA in support of its television plan. 21 m The Court concluded that the NCAA's prof-
fered justifications for the television plan were insufficient. 2 t 9 The NCAA's first procom-
petitive justification was that the television plan constituted a cooperative joint venture
which assisted in the marketing of broadcast rights to college footba11. 2" The NCAA
asserted that by coordinating the televising of games, the NCAA's television plan pro-
duced procompetitive efficiencies associated with the packaging of other television se-
ries."'
While in prior cases the Court had recognized that a cooperative arrangement may
reap some otherwise unattainable procompetitive efficiencies, 222 the NCAA Court rejected
this justification in the instant case. 223 The Court concluded that the television plan did
not produce any procompetitive efficiencies which enhanced the competitiveness of
college football television rights. 224 To the contrary, the Court concluded that NCAA
football could be marketed just as effectively without the NCAA's television controls."'
In support of this conclusion, the Court observed that college football is a unique
product, and that there is no need for collective action to enhance competition against
nonexistent competitors. 226
2j8
 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2967. The Court stated that luInder the rule of reason, these hallmarks
of anticompetitive behavior place upon petitioner a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative
defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the operations of a free market."
Id.
2" Id. at 2967-70.
220 Id. at 2967.
221 See Brief for the Petitioner at 23, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984). The
NCAA asserted that the packaging of college football games as a series was more efficient than
single sales of games because it enabled the networks to promote college football without giving
away promotional benefits to other networks. This is directly analogous to the free-riding problem
addressed by the Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, lnc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
The NCAA explained that if games were not packaged as a series and one network advertised,
another network airing college football might choose not to advertise. See Brief for the Petitioner
at 23, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984). That network would then, according to
the NCAA, benefit unjustly from the other network's promotions. Id.
The NCAA also argued that the packaging of college football games as a series was efficient
because it led to a reduction in the costs of production. Id. The association explained that their
television plan increased network coverage at the expense of local broadcasts. Id. Network games
are telecast more widely than local games would be. Id. The NCAA asserted that this would mean
reduced production costs per viewer of college football, if the size of the production crew was held
constant. Id. The NCAA noted that, alternatively, the cooperative activity would permit the em-
ployment of a larger and better production crew at the same cost per viewer. Id. at 24.
Finally, the NCAA argued that the packaging of games as a series was more efficient because
games were held open under the plan. Id. at 23. The networks asserted that this enabled the
networks to broadcast the games that appeared most likely to be exciting. Id. The NCAA maintained
that the last-minute selection of which games to telecast could not easily be arranged in the absence
of the television plan. Id. The NCAA asserted that all of these were procompetitive. Id. at 24.
222 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. I, 21 (1979). See also Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 365 (1982) (Powell,,., dissenting).
223 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2967-68.
724 Id. at 2967.
225 Id.
22" Id. at 2968. Thus, even though the NCAA Court refused to accept the notion of a threshold
market power determination in these cases, a finding that the NCAA lacked market power would
be relevant to the resolution of the case. For if' the NCAA lacked market power, its activities in
packaging a competitive series would be consistent with the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Continental
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The second procompetitive justification offered by the NCAA in defense of its
television plan was that the plan protected live attendance at games. 227 Noting that there
was no evidence to support the gate protection justification, the Court found that the
television plan simply did not protect live attendance. 22s In support of this conclusion,
the Court indicated that games were televised during all hours that they were being
played. 222 The Court also noted that attempting to protect live ticket sales from com-
petition with televised games was a justification that was inconsistent with the Sherman
Act's basic policy of free competition. 230
Finally, the Court also rejected the NCAA's assertion that its television plan was
procompetitive because it served to maintain a competitive balance among amateur
athletic teams. 231 The NCAA imposed a variety of other restrictions232
 which were,
according to the Court, better tailored to the goal of competitive balance than was the
television plan. 2" The Court concluded that these other restrictions were clearly suffi-
cient to preserve the desired competitive halance. 2" Thus, having rejected the NCAA's
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-56 (1977). The Supreme Court conceded that if
the NCAA lacked market power then collective action would be appropriate in order to enhance
college football's ability to compete. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2968 n.55.
227 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2968. The NCAA has in fact indicated a concern with protecting live
attendance since 1952. Id. at 2954-55. In explaining the procompetitiveness of this justification,
the NCAA asserted that colleges ivhose games arc not televised rely on the gate and related revenues
to support their football programs. See Brief for the Petitioner at 25, NCAA v. Board of Regents,
104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984). The NCAA claimed that the more plentiful the television offerings of
college football are, the less likely people are to attend games. Id. The NCAA pointed out that a
diversion of fans to television viewing would have an adverse affect on some schools' football
programs. Id. The NCAA argued that this would, in the long run, threaten the viability of those
programs. Id. The NCAA maintained that fewer teams would mean reduced effectiveness of
competition by NCAA football against other kinds of entertainment. Id.
228 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2968-69.
729 Id. at 2968.
"" Id. at 2969.
The NCAA noted that the television plan acted to spread television appearances among
more teams than would he the case in their absence. See Brief for the Petitioner at 20, NCAA N'.
Board of Regents. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984). The NCAA argued that by spreading national and
regional television appearances among more teams the plan increased competition because it put
the teams on more equal footing in terms of recruiting student athletes and in terms of financing
their athletic programs. Id. The NCAA claimed that the result would be teams that were more
evenly matched on the playing fields. Id, The NCAA contended that this would lead to increased
viewership because the games would be closer and more exciting. Id.
Without balanced rivalry on the field, the NCAA asserted that the quality of the product
furnished by the NCAA would decline. Id. at 21. The NCAA stated that, in turn, output, measured
as viewers, would decline as people turned to other sources for entertainment. Id.
2" The. Court noted that the - NCAA has adopted playing rules, standards of amateurism,
standards for academic eligibility, regulations concerning recruitment of athletes, and rules govern-
ing the size of athletic squads and coaching staffs. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2954. The Court stated that.
these regulatory controls were procompetitive because they enhanced public interest in intercolle-
giate athletics. Id. at 2969.
"' Id. at 2970.
299
	 The Court also &healed that the televifion plan was not even arguably tailored to serving
the interest of fostering balanced competition. Id. The Court explained that. the plan did not
regulate the amount of money that a college could spend on its football program. Id. Furthermore,
the Court pointed out that the plan did not regulate the way in which the colleges could use the
revenues generated by their football programs. Id.
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proffered justifications, and having found the anticompetitive effects of the television
plan to be readily apparent, the Supreme Court held that the television plan violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 235
justice White, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist, asserted that the
NCAA's television plan did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2" In reaching this conclusion, justice White first deter-
mined that the NCAA had no market power. 237
 He also found that the NCAA's television
plan did not have substantial anticompetitive effects. 238 Furthermore, even if there were
anticompetitive effects, those effects, Justice White argued, would he outweighed by the
NCAA's procompetitive justifications. 259
 As a final matter, Justice White concluded that
the NCAA television plan reflected the association's fundamental policy of preserving
amateurism and integrating athletics and education. 24 "
In addressing the issue of market power, Justice White indicated that because of
the broad possibilites for alternative forms of entertainment, the NCAA belonged in a
broader entertainment market for antitrust purposes than the narrow market of foot-
ba11. 241
 Moreover, according to the dissent, the record indicated that the NCAA could
not extract from the networks an amount greater than the market value of college
football television rights when competing against other types of entertainment. 242 Given
this inability of the NCAA to raise the price of its product above competitive levels,
Justice White concluded that the association had little or no market power. 2"
Furthermore, Justice White asserted that the NCAA's television plan did not have
substantial anticompetitive effects because it expanded output and did not increase
price. 244
 In reaching this conclusion, Justice White stated that total viewership was the
appropriate measure of output within the television industry. 245 By increasing network
coverage, which commands more viewers, at the expense of local broadcasts, the televi-
sion plan, Justice White argued, actually expanded the total television audience for
college footba11, 246 Thus, he concluded that the television plan expanded output. 247
In focusing on the television plan's effect on price, Justice White was unconvinced
that the NCAA's television plan resulted in an anticompetitive increase in the price of
television rights. 248
 According to the dissent, the NCAA had acted to create a new product
by restricting the number of college football games that could be televised. 249 That new
product, exclusive television rights, was more valuable to the networks, justice White
maintained, because exclusivity meant a larger share of the audience, hence greater
2" Id, at 2971.
2" Id. at 2971 (White, J., dissenting).
297
	 at 2976 (White, J., dissenting).
254
	 at 2975 (White, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 2976 (White, J., dissenting).
24 ' Id, at 2973 (White, J., dissenting).
241 Id .
 at 2977 (White, J., dissenting).
242 Id
. at 2976 (White, J., dissenting).
249
2" Id. at 2975-76 (White, J., dissenting).
24 ' Id. at 2975 (White, J., dissenting).
246 Id,
247 ,rd,
24x
249 Id. at 2976 (White, J., dissenting).
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advertising revenues and larger payments to the member universities. 25° Since the in-
crease in price related to •a new product, Justice White concluded that the price of
nonexclusive television rights was not increased. 251 In summary, because the NCAA's
television plan expanded output and did not increase price, the dissenting Justice con-
cluded that the plan did not have substantial anticompetitive effects.252
In addressing the issue of the NCAA's proffered justifications for its television plan,
Justice White stated that the NCAA had suggested a number of plausible ways in which
its television plan might enhance the ability of college football telecasts to compete against
other forms of entertainment. 253 Based on the NCAA's justifications, Justice White
maintained that even if the television plan had anticompetitive effects on competition,
he would still uphold the validity of the television plan. 254
Justice White concluded by addressing the issue of the noneconomic nature of the
NCAA's program of self-regulation. 255 He pointed out that the restraints in question
operated on nonprofit educational institutions. 256 When noneconomic values like the
association's fundamental policy of preserving amateurism and integrating athletics and
education were factored into the balance, Justice White argued, the NCAA's television
plan was eminently reasonable and did not violate antitrust law. 2" Thus, based on his
conclusions that the NCAA did not possess market power, that the NCAA's television
plan did not have substantial anticompetitive effects, that the NCAA's proffered justifi-
cations were sufficient to outweigh anticompetitive effects, and that there were important
noneconomic values to be considered, Justice White would have upheld the validity of
the television plan.'"
III. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil, only unreasonable restraints of
trade are prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act. 25° Standard Oil established that the
rule of reason should be the method of reviewing the reasonableness of restraints. 26°
The rule of reason analysis, however, .continues to be a complicated and, as a result,
time-consuming method of testing the legality of restraints of trade under the Sherman
Act.261 These difficulties stem from vague judicial declarations of the rule of reason
analysis, which have led both commentators 262 and judges263 to complain about the lack
of an analytical framework for applying the rule of reason in antitrust litigation. Where
250 Id
251 Id,
252
	 at 2975 (White, J. dissenting).
2" Id. at 2977 (White, J. dissenting).
254 Id. at 2976 (White, J. dissenting).
255 at 2977 (White, J. dissenting).
230 Id. at 2978 (White, J. dissenting).
2,57 Id.
256 Id. at 2979 (White, J., dissenting).
2 .3" See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text for discussion of the Supreme Court's decision
in Standard Oil.
21,
" See id.
201 See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text for discussion of the burdensome analysis
under the rule of reason.
21 ' 2 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 155; Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of
Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 CoLum. L. REV. 1, 34 (1978); Posner, supra note 12, at 16.
2113 See, e.g., Graphic Prods. Distribs. v. !Lek Corp., 717 F.2d 1569,1568 (11th Cir. 1983).
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applicable, the per se doctrine allows courts to avoid this burdensome analysis. 264 A
market power threshold to the application of the rule of reason would allow courts to
avoid the difficult analysis in still more cases.265
Several circuit courts have endorsed the market power threshold. 2"" Those courts
now insist, at the outset of the trial, that the plaintiff establish that the defendant has
substantial market power. 2
 When the plaintiff fails to do so, the defendant's restraints
will be found reasonable without further analysis. 2" 8
 In those instances, the threshold
inquiry into market power -becomes an effective method of avoiding the protracted
analysis required under the rule of reason. 269 NCAA v. Board of Regents presented the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to endorse a market power threshold to the appli-
cation of the rule of reason for cases under section 1 of the Sherman Act.""
In recognition of the trend in the circuit courts to structure the rule of reason
analysis by establishing a market power threshold, the NCAA argued that the 'record
indicated that the organization had no market power. 271
 The NCAA argued that a finding
of no market power was dispositive in its favor. 272
 Refusing to follow the trend in the
circuit courts, the Supreme Court rejected the NCAA's argument for a market power
threshold. 273
The Court rejected the NCAA's argument for a market power threshold as a legal
matter and as a factual matter. 274
 The Court stated that, as a matter of law, the absence
of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output. 275 The
Court's legal rationale for rejecting the market power argument is suspect because the
Court confused the rule of reason and the per se doctrine."" If this case involved a
naked restriction, which is one that is inherently likely to enhance price or restrict output
while offering no competitive benefits, 27
 it would have been proper to condemn the
NCAA's practices under the per se doctrine."" If the NCAA's practices were governed
by the per se doctrine, the Court would have been correct in its assertion that proof of
market power was not necessary because the NCAA's practices would be conclusively
264
 See supra notes 129-53 and accompanying text for discussion of the development of the per
se doctrine.
265
	 supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text for discussion of the market power threshold
as an effective method of avoiding application of the rule of reason.
266 See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text for lower court decisions endorsing the
market power threshold.
267 See id.
268 See id.
259
 See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text for discussion of the market power threshold
as an effective method of avoiding application of the rule of reason.
270 NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2965.
271 Id.
272 See Brief for the Petitoner at 34, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
279
	 104 S. Ct. at 2965-66.
274 Id.
27.5
	 at 2965.
276 See infra notes 277-80 and accompanying text for the assertion that the NCAA Court
confused the rule of reason and the per se doctrine.
"'The most common formulation offered by the Court has been that naked restrictions have
"no purpose except stifling competition•" White Motor Co. Y. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963).
278 See supra notes 129-53 and accompanying text for discussion of the application of the per
se doctrine.
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presumed unreasonable. 279 In its decision to apply the rule of reason to review the
legality of the NCAA's practices, the Court implied that the NCAA's practices were not
a naked restriction on price or output, but were mere restraints on trade subject to the
rule of reason analysis. 28° Thus, in addressing the market power threshold, the Court
should have resolved the question of whether absence of proof of market power pre-
cluded a finding that the NCAA's restraints on trade were unreasonable under the rule
of reason.
In addition, the Court stated that it had never required proof of market power in
an antitrust case in order to find a practice illegal under the rule of reason."' Clearly,
in the cases that the Court cited as authority for this proposition, it had not required
proof of market power. 282
 None of those cases, however, involved application of the rule
of reason."' Rather, they involved application of the per se doctrine. Therefore, no
support for the Court's proposition that market power had never been required under
the rule of reason is to be found in thosexases. 284
After holding that. the NCAA's market power was not relevant to its analysis of the
section 1 claims as a matter of law, the Court nevertheless went on (o analyze whether
the NCAA possessed market power. 285 The Court found that the NCAA, as a factual
matter, possessed market power. 286 In practice, to establish market power the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant has a large market share within the relevant market. 287
Defining the relevant market properly, therefore, is crucial to an accurate assessment of
market power. 288 Given an accurate treatment of the economics of the television industry,
the relevant market was not properly defined in NCAA. 289
The relevant market was not properly defined in NCAA because the Court incor-
rectly assumed that it made no difference whether the television market was defined
from the standpoint of the networks, the advertisers, or the viewers. 29ü The dissenting
279 See id.
24" NCAA, 104 S, Ct. at 2960.
"' Id. at 2965.
262
	 e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway - Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959); United States
v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 310 (1956); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S 150, 221 (1940).
283 Klor's, involved group boycotting, a per se illegal activity. Klor's 359 U.S. in `21 3. McKesson
& Robbins involved a per se illegal price-fixing agreement. McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. at 311.
Socony-Vacuum also involved an unlawful per se price-fixing agreement. Sacony-Vdruum, 310 U.S. at
223.
2
"4
 These cases merely state that lack of proof of market power has no effect on the per se
analysis. See, e.g., Klor's, 359 U.S. at 213; McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. at 310; Socony-Vacuum, 310
U.S at 221.
26s
	 104 S. Ct. at 2966.
"6 Id.
267 Market share is used in litigation as a surrogate for market power because market power is
conceptually difficult to define, and because measuring market power requires sophisticated econo-
metric analysis. Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (11th Cir. 1983).
See also Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1082).
288 The relevant market for this purpose is composed of products that have reasonable inter-
changeability. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 35! U.S. 377, 404 (1955).
269 See infra notes 290-309 and accompanying text for the assertion that, given an accurate.
treatment of the economics of the television industry, the relevant market was not properly defined
in NCAA.
690 NCAA, 109 S. Gt. 2966-67 n.49.
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Justices, however, realized that it would not be proper to define the television market
from the standpoint of the viewers."' In addition, the Department of Justice has con-
cluded that power over advertisers, and not over viewers, is the key to any market power
a program supplier, such as the NCAA, may possess. 292
In accurately assessing the economics of the television industry, the most important
fact about the industry is that the viewers are not the consumers; rather, they are a
measure of output."' A television program will generate viewers, and that, in turn, is
what causes the networks and the advertisers, the actual consumers within this industry,
to make their purchases.'294
 The networks purchase the programs that will be telecast,
and the advertisers then purchase from the networks time during those programs within
which to convey their messages to the viewing aticlience." 5
 It is within this realm that
the relevant market should have been defined, and the NCAA's market power should
have been assessed. 296
Given a market in which the networks and the advertisers arc the consumers, the
Supreme Court has indicated that if the networks and the advertisers have sufficient
substitutes for televised college football available to them, then televised college football
cannot he the relevant market."' The evidence refutes the notion that college football
is unique in its attractiveness to the networks and the advertisers. 206 First, the advertisers
substitute freely between different modes of advertising."" Network television advertis-
ing accounted for only 9.1% of all advertising expenditures in 1981. 89° Second, there is
a correlation between the movement of the prices of all television programs and' the
movement of the price of NCAA college football telecasts."' The joint movement of
prices is a standard signal that two products are in the same product market." 02 In fact,
joint price movement may be the single most useful guide to market definition." 3
Furthermore, the advertisers who purchase NCAA network spots are not specialized to
NCAA college football."4
 Even the heaviest advertiSers an NCAA football purchase 95%
of their advertising time on other prograins." 5
2" Id. at 2975 (White, J., dissenting).
2"1
	 of the Dept. of Justice, Jan, 26, 1983 at 37-39.
2" See Brief for the Petitioner at 38, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
294 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, app. at 159 (1984). (An economic analysis
of the broadcast market appears in the report of Dr. William M. Landes, who appeared as an
economic expert for the NCAA).
205 Id.
2," Since the relevant market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability,
see, e.g., E.I. DuPont, 351 U.S. at 404, proper definition of the relevant market and assessment of
market power is contingent upon finding the actual consumer.
2 " 7 Id.
298 See infra notes 299-305 and accompanying text for discussion of evidence which refutes the
notion that college football is unique in its attractiveness to the networks and the advertisers.
299 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, app. at 159 n.13 (1984).
300 Id.
:01 1d. at 164.
502 Id .
-
3"3 See, e.g., Areeda, Market Definition and Horizontal Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 553, 566
(1983).
"" 4 See Brief for the Petitioner at 41, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
se, Id.
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Thus, the evidence indicates that the networks and the advertisers have substitutes
to NCAA football available to them. 906 The availability of substitutes to the consumers
leads to the conclusion that NCAA football is part of a broader market."' Thus, the
proper relevant market in NCAA was not televised college football. 308 Rather, the proper
relevant market should have been a broader entertainment market." 9 If the relevant
market had been properly defined, it would have been evident that the NCAA lacked
market power.
Although the Supreme Court failed to endorse a market power threshold in NCAA,
that failure was based on suspect legal analysis 310 and a "confused treatment" 311 of the
economics of the television industry. 312 An endorsement of a market power threshold
by the Court would have helped to solve some of the problems presented by the current
rule of reason analysis. 313 A market power threshold would be consistent with the
objectives of the Sherman Act, it would contribute to judicial efficiency by reducing the
burden on both litigants and the judicial system, and it would provide more guidance
to the business community."
With a market power threshold, courts would be able to avoid elaborate analysis in
those cases where the plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant has substantial market
power," Limiting section 1 claims to those anticompetitive actions which are taken by
entities with substantial market power is consistent with the objectives of the Sherman
Act. 316 Lacking market power, the defendant does not have the capacity to harm com-
petition within the market because its arrangements cannot have an adverse effect on
prices or output, 317 If the defendant's acts are procompetitive, then they will be beneficial
to both the defendant and consumers alike." Alternatively, if the defendant's acts do
not affect competition, then the defendant injures only itself." Neither case, however,
is violative of the Sherman Act. 320
5" See supra notes 299-305 and accompanying text for discussion of evidence which refutes
the notion that college football is unique in its attractiveness to the networks and the advertisers.
"' See, e.g., E.I. DuPont, 351 U.S. at 404.
3°5 See id.
7"Commentators have suggested that NCAA football is part of a broader entertainment
market. See, e.g., Grauer, Recognition of the NFL as a Single Entity Under Section One of the Sherman
Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. Rev. I, 34 n.156 (1983); Note, Tackling
Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655,661-62 n.31 (1978).
710 See supra notes 275-84 and accompanying text for discussion of the Court's legal analysis
in NCAA.
7 " Note, Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87,256 (1984)..
5 ' 2 See supra notes 290-309 and accompanying text for discussion of the Court's treatment of
the economics of the television industry in NCAA.
717 See infra notes 315-34 and accompanying text for discussion of how the market power
threshold would help solve some of the problems presented by the current rule of reason analysis.
014 See id.
715 See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text for discussion of the market power threshold
as an effective method of avoiding application of the rule of reason.
71 " See supra note 80 and accompanying text for discussion of the objectives of the Sherman
Act.
5 " See supra note 12 and accompanying text for the assertion that the practices of a business
without market power cannot adversely effect competition.
31 " See id.
Mg See id.
52" See supra note 80 and accompanying text for discussion of the objectives of the Sherman
Act.
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in light of the fact that it is not inconsistent with the objectives of the antitrust laws,
a threshold finding that the defendant lacks market power should be adopted to reduce
the burden on both litigants and the judicial system of the complicated and prolonged
rule of reason analysis."' Currently, antitrust cases are extremely costly because of the
protracted factual inquiry necessary under the rule of reason. 522 A structured analysis
serves to reduce the burden on litigants by reducing the costs of litigation. 323 Also, judges
and juries are unable to do what the current open-ended formulations require of them." ,
The Court has stated that judges often lack the expert understanding of market econ-
omies needed to determine a practice's effect on competition. 325 Therefore, a structured
analysis also serves to reduce the burden on the judicial system by sharpening the judicial
focus.
A more structured formulation of the rule of reason analysis would likewise be
beneficial in providing guidance to the business community. 326 As the Supreme Court
has recognized, at present the decision in any given case provides little certainty about
the legality of a business practice in another context."' Businesses are left with little to
aid them in predicting in any particular case what business practices courts will find to
be illegal under the Sherman Act. 52° A more defined analysis would increase the pre-
dictability of the outcome of section 1 cases. 32" Such predictability creates several advan-
tages."' First, by knowing with= more certainty whether their practices were lawful,
businesses could plan their practices to avoid being sued."' Second, illegal practices will
be more obvious, and suits will more surely be brought when necessary. 332 Finally, with
regard to those suits that are brought, predictability promotes settlement. 333 Cases are
more likely to be settled when the parties can agree on the likely outcome of the trial." ,
Thus, a market power threshold would be consistent with the objectives of the Sherman
Act, it would contribute to judicial efficiency, and it would provide more certainty to the
business world.
The notion of a market power threshold, however, is not without drawbacks. Some
practices in restraint of trade may escape examination under this determination. 335 This
is not, however, a sufficient ground for invalidating the test. Along with the benefits of
321 See infra notes 322-25 and accompanying text for discussion of how the market power
threshold would reduce the burden on both litigants and the judicial system.
922 The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of a
challenged business practice entails significant costs." Arizona, 457 U.S. at 343.
32' See, e.g., Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981) ("A
requirement that plaintiff prove market power in this case would have saved the litigants and the
courts much expense.").
324 Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 153-55. See also Posner, supra note 12, at 15.
32' See, e.g., Arizona, 457 U.S. at 343; Topeo, 405 U.S. at 609-10.
326 Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 157.
327 See, e.g., Arizona, 457 U.S. at 343; Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 n.10.
32° Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 155.
329 Id. at 157.
"° See infra notes 331-.34 and accompanying text for discussion of the advantages of increased
predictability of the outcome of section 1 cases.
991 Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 157.
432 Posner, supra note 12, at 15.
493 Easterhrook, supra note 12, at 157.
394 Id. at 155 n.38.
995 1d. at 157.
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more structure comes the burden of imprecision." That is, however, a burden that the
Court has already shown that it is willing to accept in antitrust litigation, as demonstrated
by its use of the per se doctrine." 7 The per se doctrine condemns whole categories of
practices even though courts acknowledge that some practices in these categories are
most likely beneficial.s" Courts have shown themselves willing to accept such overbreadth
under the rationale that all rules are imprecise.s"
Definitional problems, in addition, may be presented by the market power thresh-
old.34° The inquiry necessary to establish the relevant market can be burdensome, and
this is not made easier by the fact that the plaintiff will try to persuade the court to
define the market as one in which the defendant has a substantial share. 341 Furthermore,
there is as yet no agreement as to how great the defendant's market share must be to
satisfy the threshold condition of substantial market power.s 42
The definitional problems, along with the possible overbreadth associated with them,
are the market power threshold's drawbacks.'" These drawbacks, however, are out-
weighed by the benefits of implementing the market power threshold." Based on those
benefits, the Supreme Court should have endorsed the market power threshold in NCAA.
IV. CONCLUSION
In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the United States Supreme Court applied rule of reason
analysis to hold that the NCAA's television plan violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Court struck down NCAA regulation of televised college football after full inquiry
into the reasonableness of the anticompetitive effects of the plan on the market in light
of the procompetitive justifications offered by the NCAA. During the course of that
inquiry, the Court rejected the NCAA's assertion that its television plan could not have
significant anticompetitive effects because the association had no market power.
In NCAA, therefore, the Supreme Court failed to endorse a market power threshold
to the application of the rule of reason. That failure, however, was based on suspect
legal analysis and a confused treatment of the economics of the television industry. The
application of a market power threshold to section 1 cases would be consistent with the
536 Id.
5" See, e.g., Arizona, 457 U.S. at 344.
536
 "For the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation
of some agreements that a fullblown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable." Id.
356 Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 157.
Admittedly, in comparing the per se doctrine and the market power threshold, there is a
difference which must he recognized. The per se doctrine errs on the side of striking down lawful
practices and the market power threshold would err on the side of protecting unlawful practices.
This difference would entail some social cost. That would, however, be a "bearable" cost. Id.
340 See infra notes 341-42 and accompanying text for discussion of the definitional problems
that might be presented by the market power threshold.
341
 Posner, supra note 12, at 17.
345 Id. At present, the court must decide whether a market share is large enough to support an
inference of the required degree of market power. Landes and Posner, supra note 12, at 938.
543 See supra notes 335-42 and accompanying text for discussion of the drawbacks of the market
power threshold.
"I See supra notes 313-34 and accompanying text for discussion of the benefits of implementing
the market power threshold.
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objectives of the Sherman Act, would contribute to judicial efficiency by reducing the
burden on both litigants and the judicial system, and would provide more guidance to
the business community. Therefore, the Court should have endorsed a market power
threshold as an effective method of avoiding the rule of reason and its complicated and
prolonged analysis in certain limited circumstances.
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